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Despite significant investment and anti-corruption capacity building in 
the past decades, ‘most systematically corrupt countries are considered 
to be just as corrupt now as they were before the anti-corruption 
interventions’.1 Statements like this are indicative of the frustration shared 
by practitioners and scholars alike at the apparent lack of success in 
controlling corruption worldwide and point to the need to rethink our 
understanding of the factors that fuel corruption and make it so hard to 
abate. In this article we propose a novel analytical lens through which to 
understand the root causes of corruption. Our arguments emerge out of 
the study of commonplace practices shaping political, economic and social 
outcomes in Mexico, Russia and Tanzania. The comparative analysis of 
these three seemingly dissimilar cases revealed striking similarities in 
rudimentary patterns of informal governance, which in turn can be linked 
to specific incentives to engage in corrupt behaviours.
  On this basis, we propose to integrate notions of informality and 
informal practices into the discussion of corruption and aim to uncover the 
ways in which they are embedded in social and political behaviours. Given 
the tacit nature of the informal order embodied by the practices of informal 
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1  H. Marquette and C. Peiffer, ‘Corruption and Collective Action’, U4 Research Paper, 
32, University of Birmingham, 2015.
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governance in groups, organizations, elites and societies, it is perhaps not 
surprising that until now the literature on informal governance has been 
somewhat limited.2 Therefore, we embark on a challenging yet effective 
quest to assemble ethnographies of informal governance expressed in 
‘vernacular knowledge’ and to identify similarities and differences across 
our three cases.3 We discover rudimentary patterns of informal governance 
that perform a valued role for those actively engaged in them and establish 
that such patterns operate at most levels. Acknowledging the functionality 
of informal practices goes a long way in accounting for their resilience. The 
vernacular evidence we have gathered reveals the instrumental value of 
informal governance practices employed by authoritarian elites to ensure 
regime survival, which sheds light on the mechanisms underpinning the 
strong correlation observed between high levels of corruption and non-
democratic regimes.4 
 The comparative analysis of informal governance is based on our 
respective experience of conducting extensive research in Mexico, Russia 
and Tanzania. Since we discovered remarkable similarities in the informal 
practices prevalent in our three countries, we have been working on 
possible ways of conceptualizing and framing informal governance norms 
and practices. Thus, while the ideas presented here do not stem from a 
rigorous comparative research design, nonetheless the parallels found are 
compelling enough to warrant theorization and further testing. With the 
prospect of opening new avenues for developing innovative approaches 
to anti-corruption policy-making, we hereby propose a comparative 
framework for further research on informal governance and corruption.5
2  T. Christiansen and S. Piattoni, Informal Governance in the European Union, 
Cheltenham and Northampton MA, 2003; T. Christiansen and C. Neuhold, International 
Handbook of Informal Governance, Cheltenham, 2012; A. V. Ledeneva, ‘Russia’s Practical 
Norms and Informal Governance: The Origins of Endemic Corruption’, Social Research, 
80, 2013, 4, pp. 1135–62.
3  Jan Kubik and Amy Linch, Postcommunism from Within: Social Justice, Mobilization, 
and Hegemony, New York and London, 2013, pp. 57, 63.
4  Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption and Government, Cambridge, 1999; Rajeev 
K. Goel and Michael A. Nelson, ‘Economic Freedom Versus Political Freedom: Cross-
Country Influences On Corruption’, Australian Economic Papers, 44, 2005, 2,  pp. 121–33. 
5  We will further test the ideas presented here in a wider set of countries in a 
comparative research project funded by the British Academy/DFID Anti-Corruption 
Evidence Programme where the authors are Principal and Co-Investigators. The case 
study countries in this project are Kenya, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Rwanda, Tanzania and 
Uganda. For more information and updates on this research project, please see <http://
www.britac.ac.uk/node/4660>.
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 Our conceptual framework highlights the underlying factors generating 
and perpetuating collective action dilemmas in contexts where a ‘principled 
principal’ is conspicuously absent.6 Our inductive approach allows us 
to discover how informal governance mechanisms shape or impede the 
performance of formal institutions, thus accounting for the so-called 
implementation gap. In spite of cultural, historical and regional diversity, 
the three countries we have studied share a characteristic that is stubbornly 
persistent outside of the developed world: the failure to control corruption 
notwithstanding the adoption of exemplary legal frameworks that 
incorporate many of the internationally recognized best anti-corruption 
practices. Figure 1 illustrates the difference between the formal quality of 
anticorruption legislation and actual implementation in our three countries 
as captured by the Global Integrity Scorecard.7
Figure 1. Indicators of the effectiveness of anti-corruption laws in Mexico, 
Russia and Tanzania
6  E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective 
Action, Cambridge, 1990; A. Persson, B. Rothstein and J. Teorell, ‘Why Anticorruption 
Reforms Fail — Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem’, Governance, 26, 
2013, 3, pp. 449–71.
7  Global Integrity’s scorecard summarizes key findings from that organization’s 
annual reports in which countries are evaluated, amongst other things, on the basis of 
the quality of their anti-corruption legal frameworks and the extent to which such legal 
frameworks are actually implemented and enforced. See <http://www.globalintegrity.org/
research/reports/global-integrity-report/> [accessed 27 July 2016].
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 Such a discrepancy does not imply that these countries lack order or 
effective governance altogether. Rather, the evidence points to the essential 
role that informal norms and practices play in cases where corruption 
is widespread. In other words, as Anders found for the case of Malawi, 
‘beneath the layer of statutes, regulations and bureaucratic hierarchies 
there is a complex web of interpersonal relationships amounting to a 
parallel structure within the civil service’.8 We think that understanding 
the logics upon which such informal parallel structures function, and 
analysing them in comparative contexts, is key to overcoming limitations 
of conventional anti-corruption remedies.
 Furthermore, while such logics may be grounded in informal norms 
and practices, they are not purely ‘cultural’. Rather, we underscore that they 
are resilient because they perform critical functions for the political elites, 
private interests and ordinary citizens. In fact, we find that the instruments 
of informal governance perform both allocative and regulatory functions 
that are not dissimilar to those of formal governance, whereby they both 
re-distribute official power and resources, on the one hand, and regulate 
access to and exclusion from the benefits of such redistribution, on the 
other. 
 Our conceptual framework includes three major modalities of informal 
governance, which we have termed co-optation, control and camouflage. 
These modalities are instruments utilized by networks of actors spanning 
the public-private divide to sustain informal governance regimes whereby 
resources are redistributed in favour of some groups at the expense 
of others, ensuring discipline among the recipients of resources and 
protecting the networks from external threats. 
 The research focus is on the workings of networks including the 
particular interests of their members, the relationships between donors 
and recipients and other alliances bound together by virtue of unwritten 
rights and obligations.9 The prominent role we give to power networks is 
supported by evidence gathered in our previous research which suggests 
that these powerful elite networks channel informal flows of influence, 
resources and sanctions.10 
8  G. Anders, ‘Like Chameleons: Civil Servants and Corruption in Malawi’, Bulletin de 
l’APAD, 23–24, 2002 <http://apad.revues.org/137> [accessed 29 July 2016].
9  By network, we mean a ‘pattern of interdependence among social actors in which 
at least a portion of the links are framed in terms of something other than superior–
subordinate relations’. Laurence J. O’Toole Jr. and Kenneth J. Meier, ‘Desperately Seeking 
Selznick: Cooptation and the Dark Side of Public Management in Networks’, Public 
Administration Review, 64, 2004, 6, pp. 681–93 (p. 682).
10  C. Baez-Camargo, ‘Using Power and Influence Analysis to Address Corruption 
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 Power networks are criss-crossing, overlapping groupings of individuals 
linked to a person in the position of power. Such networks operate across 
organizations and are therefore more suited analytically to capture the 
complexities of informal governance as compared to the formal institutions 
of the state. Whereas formal organizations are meant to work on the basis 
of universalistic and impersonal rules, power networks operate according 
to particularistic and personalist criteria.11 
 The three modalities of informal governance are highly interdependent, 
all being based, directly or indirectly, upon the covert redistribution of 
resources. Whereas co-optation is associated with recruitment to the 
power network, control is about ensuring discipline among the network 
members, while camouflage is needed to protect the network. 
Co-optation
For the purposes of our analysis, we use the term co-optation to refer to 
the practices of building ‘capacity to tie strategically-relevant actors to the 
regime elite’.12 What is significant about the practices of co-optation we 
have identified is that they not only represent a mechanism of recruitment 
into networks, but also involve an informal redistribution of resources in 
favour of the recruited. The criteria for such recruitment and the non-
transparency of the redistribution are both linked to corrupt behaviours.13 
Risks: The Case of the Ugandan Drug Supply Chain’, U4 Brief, 2012 <http://www.u4.no/
publications/using-power-and-influence-analysis-to-address-corruption-risks-the-case-
of-the-ugandan-drug-supply-chain/>; C. Baez-Camargo and R. Sambaiga, ‘Between 
Condemnation and Resignation: A Study on Attitudes Towards Corruption in the Public 
Health Sector in Tanzania’, in Davide Torsello (ed.), Corruption in Public Administration: 
An Ethnographic Approach, Cheltenham and Northampton, MA, 2016; A. Ledeneva, 
Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking and Informal Exchange, New York and 
Cambridge, 1998.
11  We thank our colleague Giga Zedania for pointing out this important distinction. 
See also, A. Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise? Sistema, Power Networks and Informal 
Governance, Cambridge and New York, 2013.
12  J. Gerschewski, ‘The Three Pillars of Stability: Legitimation, Repression, and 
Cooptation in Autocratic Regimes’, Democratization, 20, 2013, 1, pp. 13–38.
13  The term co-optation is by no means new in the social sciences and has been 
conceptualized in various manners. In the sociological literature, and in particular in 
the theory of organizations, the co-optative process has been viewed as a mechanism of 
adjustment aimed at guaranteeing stability for an authority in the face of a threat. See 
P. Selznick, ‘Foundations of the Theory of Organization’, American Sociological Review, 
13, 1948, 1, pp. 25–35. Acemoglu and Robinson categorize policy decisions as co-optation 
to the extent that these may be understood as a strategy to avoid upheaval (as in the 
extension of a franchise): D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship 
and Democracy, New York and Cambridge, 2005. For Bertocchi and Spagat (2001) the 
co-optation strategy implies the creation of a new, privileged group that separates itself 
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 While informal practices of co-optation serve the purpose of network 
recruitment and maintenance rather effectively, they operate according to 
a logic that is different from that of the formal institutions of the Weberian 
state. The distribution of positions of power and authority effected through 
co-optation generates and supports relationships based on strong bonds of 
trust, reciprocity and loyalty. Such relationships, upon which the networks 
rely and to which they respond, are used for informal governance. 
Thus, in settings where co-optation practices are commonplace, formal 
accountability is replaced by personal loyalties and informal checks and 
balances (see section on control). 
 As the evidence suggests, co-optation practices involve not only 
networks of political elites but also networks associated to business 
interests, organized crime and grassroots social groups. Moreover, one 
could model co-optation practices as operating across at least three 
dimensions — top-down, horizontal and bottom up — depending on the 
nature of the networks involved (see Figure 1). 
Prebendal co-optation: top-down pattern
We term the first, top-down co-optation mode utilized by political 
elites ‘prebendal’ co-optation because it involves the strategic political 
allocation of public offices to key elites, granting personal access over state 
resources.14 In practice, prebendal co-optation entails the redistribution 
of the resources of the public sector to the private benefit of the ruling 
political networks and therefore also implies a privatization of public 
office.15
 Our findings are consistent with the proposition that prebendal 
co-optation is a practice widely resorted to because it plays a key role in 
ensuring regime stability in that it is conducive to ensuring elite cohesion 
and to strategically securing bases of support for the regime. Such practices 
have been well documented and even conceptualized among other 
governance models as ‘limited access orders’.16 
from its group of origin: G. Bertocchi and M. Spagat, ‘The Politics of Co-optation’, Journal 
of Comparative Economics, 29, 2001, pp. 591–607. We opt for a broad definition since we 
find that the practices of co-optation have multiple manifestations and can be adopted by 
multiple social groups, not just political elites.
14  N. Van de Walle, ‘The Path from Neopatrimonialism: Democracy and Clientelism 
in Africa Today’, in D. C. Bach and M. Gazibo (eds), Neopatrimonialism in Africa and 
Beyond, Abingdon and New York, 2012, p. 113.
15  R. A. Joseph, Democracy and Prebendal Politics in Nigeria, Cambridge, 1987.
16  S. Chayes, Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security, New York, 
2015; D. C. North, ‘Limited Access Orders in the Developing World: A New Approach 
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 State exploitation by means of appointments of allies and potential 
opponents into public office has been a common practice among political 
elites across the three countries we studied. Whether to fill their own 
pockets or to selectively distribute among their own clientele, the recipients 
of the co-opting appointment invariably enjoy impunity in exploiting the 
power and resources associated to public office in exchange for mobilizing 
support and maintaining loyalty to the regime. This is the unwritten rule 
of prebendal co-optation: unconditional support for the regime is expected 
in exchange for impunity from corrupt exploitation of public office.
 Prebendal cooptation practices in the three countries, although 
informal and in principle clandestine, are also commonplaces in their 
respective societies. They are open secrets which have come to form part 
of the political culture, as well as folklore, reflected by the euphemisms 
people use to refer to them. Strikingly, these euphemisms are similar across 
the three cases and point to the underlying logic of ‘feeding’. 
 Expectations about ‘irregularities’ in the behaviours of the políticos 
became part of popular Mexican political culture: when a state official 
obtained an exploitable position in public office, in popular speech this 
would be referred to as ‘to be given a bone’ (le dieron un hueso) making 
reference to how the office holder would be able to gnaw on the bone.17 
Similarly, the term ‘feeding’ (kormlenie) was used in Russia to denote the 
distribution of regional constituencies for private needs. It has evolved 
into a widely recognized practical norm, captured in Nikolai Karamzin’s 
remark, ‘one steals’ (voruyut);18 in Soviet times, the so-called ‘feeding 
places’ (kormushki) for the party nomenklatura, and pilfering or siphoning 
out state property by workers (nesuny). While these practices are often 
seen as compensatory for the oppressive regimes,19 in the aftermath of the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia came to be seen as a kleptocracy.20 It 
is similarly common in Tanzania for public officials to extract rents from 
to the Problems of Development’, Policy Research Working Paper 4359, World Bank, 
Washington, D.C., 2007. 
17  During the seventy-year-long hegemonic rule of the Mexican Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) personal enrichment of party officials was not only tolerated but even 
considered a sign of adeptness and suitability for public office — as expressed by a quote 
of a powerful PRI cadre who said that ‘a politician who is poor is a poor politician’ (un 
político pobre es un pobre político).
18  N. M. Karamzin, Primechaniia k Istorii Gosudarstva Rossiiskogo, vols 1–4, 1852.
19  K. M. Simis, USSR: The Corrupt Society, New York, 1982.
20  J. Granville, ‘“Dermokratizatsiya” and “Prikhvatizatsiya”: The Russian Kleptocracy 
and Rise of Organized Crime’, Demokratizatsiya, 11, 2003, 3, pp. 449–57; S. Rosefielde, 
‘Russia: An Abnormal Country’, The European Journal of Comparative Economics, 2, 2005, 
1, pp. 3–16; K. Dawisha, Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?, New York, 2014.
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their positions in public office. Even if the popular perception of leadership 
as an opportunity to accumulate resources and move up the social ladder 
is not fully articulated, being poor is anecdotally linked to being stupid. 
On the contrary, being smart and engaging in some form of prebendalism 
is referred to locally as ‘eating’ (kula), and is associated to what Bayart has 
coined as the ‘politics of the belly’.21
 Apart from satisfying personal needs, prebendal co-optation is an 
instrument of power sharing: it works by recruiting potential adversaries 
into the ruling network while also rewarding loyal supporters. In our 
three cases, prebendal co-optation is enacted through formal and informal 
appointments made by a strong president. In the Mexican and Tanzanian 
cases, the president has traditionally been both head of state and leader of 
the hegemonic party with extraordinary powers: the Partido Revolucionario 
Institucional (PRI) held power uninterruptedly in Mexico for seventy-one 
years from 1929 until 2000,22 while the Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) has 
been in power in Tanzania since independence in 1961–62. In these cases, 
the influential political networks were embedded in the ruling party, 
which was recognized as the only viable vehicle to pursue a political career. 
Both the PRI and CCM have accommodated a ruling elite composed 
of a number of political factions associated with influential social 
groups and regional interests. The two parties have played a crucial role 
promoting elite cohesion since, beyond the staging of regular elections, real 
competition for power took place among rival factions through internal 
(and mostly non-transparent) party processes whereby the ‘losing’ groups 
could be compensated in the form of appointments to plum positions in 
government. This was also the case within the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union (CPSU) and to some extent is also replicated within present-
day Russia’s ruling party, United Russia.   
 Prebendal co-optation has therefore played an important role in 
maintaining the support and loyalty of influential groups and party factions. 
For instance, Mexican labour union leaders, many of them notorious for 
amassing huge personal fortunes, often had substantial powers because 
21  In Nigeria, the analogous practice is called ‘stomach infrastructure’. J. F. Bayart, The 
State in Africa: The Politics of the Belly, New York, 1993.
22  Although the PRI has been back in power since 2012, the political context has changed 
and can no longer be characterized as a hegemonic party regime. Thus, while many of the 
informal governance patterns that were established and consolidated during the period 
of PRI hegemony in the twentieth century have continued to be relevant to date, more 
research is needed to discern exactly how they have been transformed by democratization 
and alternation in power. The patterns identified in this study should therefore be, for the 
most part, understood as associated to the hegemonic party era of Mexican politics.   
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of the strategic function they played through the incorporation of their 
organizations into the ruling party. They traded social stability and votes 
in exchange for high-level positions and access to wealth. One finds 
similar arrangements between the ruling United Russia party and regional 
governors, where personalized loyalty is often the key criteria for political 
appointments, as well as within the Tanzanian CCM where the unwritten 
rule of impunity has always been respected for allies as long as they have 
remained politically influential — commanding loyal bases of support and 
delivering votes for the party. 
 In Russia, ‘sharing’ with those above and below implies a ‘certain 
practical sense’ with regard to feeding.23 Although granted some impunity, 
a Russian official should remain careful not to lose his sense of proportion, 
and consult with the boss, exercise fairness and above all transparency in 
sharing kickbacks with bosses, peers and subordinates. Regional ‘feeds’ are 
informally, yet zealously, monitored. As a Russian anecdote has it, ‘state 
officials are caught not for stealing but for stealing too much for their 
rank’.
 The pattern is slightly different in Tanzania where influential political 
figures associated with corruption scandals may be removed from office, 
sometimes relocated to other positions of public authority and returned to 
their home constituencies where they are received as heroes,24 but in any 
event they are never prosecuted.
 Historically, prebendalism has been associated with traditional societies 
where resource constraints made this method of remunerating public 
officials attractive, as during the late middle ages in Russia where political 
elites rewarded disinterested public servants who served their country 
well with exclusive rights to exploit regional constituencies for private 
needs.25 Our cases, however, demonstrate that prebendal co-optation is not 
only a pre-modern phenomenon. Rather, prebendal co-optation has been 
resorted to on the part of state officials and beyond as a practical, if semi-
legitimate, norm which we nowadays associate with embezzlement and 
political corruption. Nonetheless, we argue that it continues to serve the 
same purpose of facilitating elite cohesion and strategically securing bases 
of support for the regime.
23  Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?, p. 103.
24  G. Hyden and M. Mmuya, ‘Power and Policy Slippage in Tanzania: Discussing 
National Ownership of Development’, Sida Studies, 21, 2008, pp. 39–39.
25  V. O. Kliuchevskii, Kurs Rossiiskoi Istorii, part 2, vol. 2, Moscow, 1988, p. 316.
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Reciprocal co-optation: horizontal pattern
Co-optation practices often link political networks with other influential 
groups and in doing so serve the mutual benefit of those involved. For 
example, political leaders, faced with undertaking far reaching systemic 
reforms (such as in the post-Soviet transition to market economies), 
recognize the potentially disruptive power of major interest groups 
and resort to co-optation tactics, whereby these groups are turned into 
stakeholders by channelling  significant resources and linking their self-
interest to the success of the privatization project.26 
 In what may be viewed as reciprocal co-optation, we identify practices 
by means of which political elites not only gather the support of influential 
non-state actors but also become recruited into exercising public authority 
to inordinately favour particular interests. This type of co-optation 
pattern can be characterized as horizontal, to the degree that it turns 
power networks into symbiotic relationships involving political elites and 
business interests and, in the case of Mexico, also organized crime.
 In this modality, co-optation promotes the interests of both political 
and business groups. Political elites need the support of major business 
interests, because the latter can seriously destabilize political regimes and, 
in the case of competitive authoritarian regimes, are also often key funders 
of costly electoral campaigns. Business interest groups, for their part, profit 
from recruiting major political figures to ensure their interests will be 
protected and promoted by the authorities. Therefore, through reciprocal 
co-optation political and business elites recruit each other into their 
networks — consolidating a new network — whereby the support bases of 
the regime are solidified and business interests capture state functions. 
 Whereas in Russia in the 1990s one spoke of state capture by large 
businesses, since the 2000s under Putin’s networks-based system of 
governance, known as sistema, it became necessary for businesses to secure 
‘political protection’ (kryshi). Informal alliances between state officials 
and businesses, elected representatives and business interests, as well as 
informal financial flows linking politicians and business elites are indeed 
perceived to be mutually beneficial.27 
 In a similar fashion, anti-corruption experts in Tanzania refer to 
so-called ‘king makers’, alluding to influential business interests that 
search out promising individuals among CCM cadres with the prospect of 
making connections with the right people in exchange for financial support 
to bolster their political careers. The beneficiaries of such sponsorship 
26  Bertocchi and Spagat, ‘The Politics of Co-optation’, p. 592.
27  Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?
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are then indebted and expected to equally reciprocate by garnering and 
allocating substantial benefits to the sponsors. 
 Similarly, corrupt practices emerge to serve the private interests of state 
and criminal actors. As aptly documented in a journalistic investigation, 
mutual protection relationships have developed in Mexico since the 1970s 
linking certain high-level political figures and drug trafficking leaders.28 
Such relationships have involved the exchange of significant amounts of 
money (delivered regularly, almost in tax-like fashion) in return for official 
disregard (and in some cases even facilitation) of the diverse activities of 
the cartels.
 Reciprocal co-optation may result in awarding inordinate numbers of 
major procurement contacts, extra-legal tax exemptions or other kinds of 
benefits to business allies, and is therefore associated with corruption in 
both the procurement process and state capture.29 A critical implication 
of such patterns of selective co-optation is that they entail an informal 
redistribution of state resources and therefore establish and reinforce 
a fundamental disparity between the beneficiaries of such informal 
exchanges and those who are excluded. 
Grassroots co-optation: bottom-up pattern 
Bottom-up co-optation is the reverse of top-down co-optation. At the 
grassroots level public officials deliver support for the regime in the form 
of tangible expressions of popular support while granting favours and 
delivering resources and services to particular constituencies. Co-optation 
at the grassroots level is a functional practice from the perspective of 
regime insiders because, as the vast literature on clientelism and patronage 
has documented,30 it helps win elections, generates legitimacy for the status 
quo and avoids social discontent. However, we also find that grassroots 
networks may pressurize public officers and co-opt them, ‘bottom-up’ 
fashion.
28  A. Hernández, Los Señores Del Narco, Mexico City, 2010.
29  See Mihály Fazekas and Luciana Cingolani’s article in this issue.
30  D. W. Brinkerhoff and A. A. Goldsmith, ‘Clientelism, Patrimonialism and Democratic 
Governance: An Overview and Framework for Assessment and Programming’, Cambridge 
MA, 2002; de Walle, ‘The Path from Neopatrimonialism’; J. Auyero, P. Lapegna, F. P. 
Poma, ‘Patronage Politics and Contentious Collective Action: A Recursive Relationship’, 
Latin American Politics and Society, 51, 2009, pp. 1–3; J. F. Medard, ‘The Underdeveloped 
State in Tropical Africa: Political Clientelism or Neopatrimonialism?’, in S. C. Clapham 
(ed.), Private Patronage and Public Power: Political Clientelism in the Modern State, 
London, 1982, pp. 162, n.192; M. W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge, 
2012.
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 Tanzanian voters understand the logic of clientelism well and refer to 
electoral campaigns as ‘harvesting seasons’ — the season of exchanging 
votes for gifts of money, beer, meals and party apparel referred to 
colloquially as ‘food’, ‘soda’, ‘sugar’ or ‘tea’.31 Through the playful use of 
language, people joke that they give politicians kula (eat) when they mean 
kura (votes), which implies that they are giving the candidates a chance to 
eat by electing them. In rural Mexican communities our research revealed 
the prevalence of more coercive ways to instruct low income indigenous 
communities to cast their votes for a particular political party by 
informing their perception of conditional entitlement to federally allocated 
cash benefits. Multiple practices of vote-selling can be observed in Russia 
and other post-Communist societies.32
 From this perspective co-optation is also highly functional. What 
prevails in our interview data is the respondents’ emphasis on the role of 
informal networks, which may be formed on the basis of different criteria 
such as kinship, friendship, neighbourhood or profession. Here, the 
network expects a proactive stance on the part of the group member who is 
appointed or recruited into a position of public office in solving problems 
and enabling access to benefits and resources in the interests of the 
network. The importance of obligations associated with family, ethnic and 
other forms of social ties in Africa,33 Russia34 and in Tanzania specifically, 
has been well documented.35 One of the main arguments is that people’s 
identification and relationship with the state and its institutions are 
significantly weaker than the identification and relationships with such 
groups, and that transactions follow what scholars call the ‘economy of 
31  K. D. Phillips, ‘Pater Rules Best: Political Kinship and Party Politics in Tanzania’s 
Presidential Elections’, PoLAR: The Political and Legal Anthropology Review, 33, 2010, pp. 
109–32.
32  A. Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works: The Informal Practices That Shaped Post-
Soviet Politics and Business, Ithaca NY, 2006.
33  J. P. Olivier de Sardan, ‘A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?’, The Journal of 
Modern African Studies, 37, pp. 25; G. Anders, Civil Servants in Malawi: Cultural Dualism, 
Moonlighting and Corruption in the Shadow of Good Governance, Erasmus University 
Rotterdam, 2005 <http://repub.eur.nl/pub/1944> [accessed 29 July 2016].
34  Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours; S. Rose-Ackerman, Trust, Honesty, and 
Corruption: Reflection on the State-Building Process, John M. Olin Center for Studies in 
Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Papers 255, 2001.
35  G. Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Underdevelopment and an Uncaptured 
Peasantry, Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA, 1980; B. Heilman and L. Ndumbaro, ‘Corruption, 
Politics, and Societal Values in Tanzania: An Evaluation of the Mkapa Administration’s 
Anti-Corruption Efforts’, African Journal of Political Science and International Relations, 
7, 2002, 1, pp. 1–19.
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affection’ or ‘economies of favour’.36 As a consequence, practices of ‘eating’ 
are socially understood in such a manner whereby the public official ‘eats’ 
not just for him or herself but for the group. An unwritten but strongly 
expected duty prescribes the provision of the fruits of holding the public 
office back to the respective constituencies. Therefore, Russian sistema is 
grounded in the practices of kickbacks sharing,37 while Tanzanian public 
officials are expected to deliver not on the basis of national policies and 
priorities but rather as patrons of specific demographic groups.38 
 Our research in rural areas of Mexico suggests that informal practices 
of bottom up co-optation are not necessarily only founded on fixed 
attributes such as kinship or ethnicity but can also be employed creatively 
in constructing informal networks. Implicit is the common understanding 
among these communities that access to state services and benefits is 
conditional and requires adopting certain behaviours that will help them 
secure favourable outcomes. The intended outcome of such behaviours is to 
co-opt key state officials to ensure access to state resources. These practices 
involve simple, symbolic gestures, as one example from our field research 
illustrates: low-income women in remote rural communities organize 
fancy meals at their own expense for the public officials who come to their 
communities in order to deliver the cash benefits from a federal poverty 
relief programme. This action is intended as pre-emptive gift giving, which 
is expected to create a link of reciprocity with those public officials and to 
‘informalize’ the distribution process to the women’s advantage.39
 In these examples, the co-optation of public officials on the part of 
grassroots network generates social pressure, whereby the informal network 
obligations override the duties of the public office, and practices of petty 
corruption emerge to bridge the conflicting demands. Thus, such informal 
ties play an ambivalent role in sustaining community dependence, regime 
36  B. Z. Osei-Hwedie and K. Osei-Hwedie, ‘The Political, Economic, and Cultural 
Bases of Corruption in Africa’, in K. R. H. Sr and B. C. Chikulo (eds), Corruption and 
Development in Africa, London, 2000, pp. 40–56; G. Hyden, ‘The Economy of Affection 
Revisited: African Development Management in Perspective’, in Henrik S. Marcussen 
(ed.), Improved Natural Resource Management — The Role of Formal Organisations and 
Informal Networks and Institutions, International Development Studies Occasional Paper, 
17, Roskilde, 2014, pp. 53–75; Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours; D. Henig and N. 
Makovicky (eds), Economies of Favour after Socialism, Oxford and New York, 2017.
37  Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?  
38  Baez-Camargo and Sambaiga, ‘Between Condemnation and Resignation’.
39  C. Baez-Camargo and R. Megchún, ‘Old Regime Habits Die Hard: Clientelism, 
Patronage and the Challenges to Overcoming Corruption in Post-Authoritarian Mexico’, 
in D. Torsello (ed.), Corruption in Public Administration: An Ethnographic Approach, 
Cheltenham and Northampton, MA, 2016.
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stability and its base for support. While presented as ways to compensate 
for the defects of state institutions, bottom up co-optation of public 
officials into social networks, based on social ties, amity and reciprocity, 
also undermines formal accountability mechanisms.
Control
Although co-optation may be effective in providing a solution to the 
problems associated with securing support for the regime on the part of 
influential groups, in practice the gap between the formal responsibilities 
and the priorities of various power networks can also create clashes of 
hidden interests and covert conflict. Thus, co-optation goes hand in hand 
with practices of informal checks and balances that ensure informal order 
and discipline within networks and embody enforcement mechanisms to 
manage dissent. 
 Such control mechanisms can be found in all three cases. They 
represent the second modality of informal governance emanating from 
the necessity to enforce the unwritten rule following obligations to which 
regime insiders and their supporters are bound. In a similar manner as the 
co-optation practices discussed above, control practices may be applied in 
a top-down, horizontal or bottom-up manner. Control mechanisms may 
also be direct or indirect in nature. When viewed in the context of informal 
control, it turns out that the holders of public office are not independent 
(within their remit) individuals or ‘iron cage’ bureaucrats — but rather are 
bound by personalized loyalties and are held under extra-legal pressure on 
the part of the networks they belong to.
Top down, direct control: demonstrative punishment and selective law 
enforcement
The first pattern of informal control practices that we identify is what we 
may call demonstrative punishment. While the punishment itself can be 
formal — exercised in a hierarchical, top-down and direct manner — its 
selective enforcement serves the informal agenda that underpins the prebendal 
co-optation: it ensures impunity for the exploitation of public office in 
exchange for unconditional support for and loyalty to the regime on the one 
hand, and the atmosphere of ‘suspended punishment’ on the other.40
 This pattern of control and its selective enforcement for those dissenting 
from the informal order is essential for the co-optation patterns to work: 
the same extra-legal rewards used to secure support from key individuals 
or groups may also be held against them should it be necessary to reinforce 
40  Ledeneva, Russia’s Economy of Favours.
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discipline and elite cohesion. The normative ambivalence intrinsic in 
this type of informal control is best expressed in the saying commonly 
attributed to Brazilian dictator Getulio Vargas: ‘for my friends, everything 
— for my enemies, the law.’41 
 It is tempting to think about informal control as a pyramid, by analogy 
with formal power, because the networks involved in informal governance 
are somewhat vertically integrated, and somewhat hierarchical, which 
makes them similarly rigid and brutal ‘like a wolves’ pack’ (in the 
expression of one respondent).42 Yet they surface in more subtle ways and 
involve constant and mutual monitoring by key players. In Putin’s sistema, 
state institutions are controlled through his ‘core contacts’, ‘curators’ and 
highly personalized monitoring and reporting practices within Putin’s 
networks.43 Such control practices penetrate also non-state companies, 
which are likely to be informally supervised by ‘parachuters’ — people 
appointed over the heads of their formal bosses and personally connected 
to the political leadership.
 Some of the most emblematic cases of enforcement of formal sanctions 
upon former allies have involved influential union leaders in Mexico. In 
the 1988 presidential elections, Joaquin Hernández Galicia (also known 
as la Quina), the leader of the powerful oil workers’ union, who was 
known for having amassed a personal fortune exploiting his position, 
challenged the presidential nomination of Carlos Salinas de Gortari 
from the PRI by instructing union members to vote for the opposition 
candidate. As a response, Salinas de Gortari pledged to end all chiefdoms 
(cacicazgos), especially those in which corrupt leaders enriched themselves 
at the expense of citizens and workers. La Quina was convicted for illegal 
possession of weapons and gangsterism in what came to be known as 
the Quinazo — a symbol for personalized and exemplary punishment of 
regime traitors.44 
41  See, for example, G. O’Donnell, Why the Rule of Law Matters, in L. Diamond and 
L. Morlino (eds), Assessing the Quality of Democracy, Baltimore, MD, 2005, pp. 3–17. 
Although most commonly associated to Vargas, this phrase has also been attributed to 
former Peruvian president Oscar Benavide. See ‘Knock, Knock’, The Economist, 21 July 
2012 <http://www.economist.com/node/21559384> [accessed 28 July 2016].
42  S. Guriev and D. Triesman, How Modern Dictators Survive: An Informational Theory 
of the New Authoritarianism, NBER Working Paper 21136, 2015 <http://www.nber.org/
papers/w21136>.
43  Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?; G. Pavlovsky, The Russian System: A View from 
the Inside, Wilson Center, 9 September 2016 <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/the-
russian-system-view-the-inside>.
44  Sistema wisdom has it: ‘Be ready to accept that you may never understand what has 
brought you down.’
CLAUDIA BAEZ-CAMARGO & ALENA LEDENEVA64
Indirect control patterns: blackmail and self-censorship
Informal control can be exercised indirectly. This is vividly illustrated 
by the Russian politics of fear, or ‘suspended punishment’, which is more 
preventive than punitive and based on collecting compromising materials 
(kompromat) on enemies and protestors, but particularly on friends and 
allies.45 Heads of the Soviet state were known to rely on their security 
services for gathering and keeping sensitive information (kompromat files) 
on their staff and appointees. In Putin’s sistema, the supervisory role of 
security services goes beyond assembling information and maintaining 
the ‘safety net’ of the regime. The presence of siloviki, usually associated 
with the security services and colloquially known as curators (kuratory or 
smotryashchie), has increased since the year 2000 together with the state 
ownership of large companies and the creation of state corporations,46 and 
due to their own appetite for acquiring private wealth. The activities of 
power ministries (siloviki) have become associated with informal control 
and rent-seeking behaviour (koshmarit´ or otzhimat´ biznes); ‘authorized’ 
corporate attacks (sistema raiding), and acts of depriving business owners 
of their business using threats of state persecution, often covered with the 
rhetoric of patriotism.47
 Informal control and monitoring in the context of ‘politics of fear’ or 
‘suspended punishment’ generates self-censorship among members of the 
elites and social networks. Understanding that violating unwritten rules 
is much more dangerous than that of formal laws ensures self-imposed 
discipline when it comes to the following of the unwritten rules of the 
game, which typically demand displaying unconditional loyalty and 
support for the regime.
 As the leader of the main PRI labour confederation once put it, ‘he 
who moves does not get in the picture’ (el que se mueve no sale en la foto), 
referring to the imperative of standing still, always acquiescing to one’s 
boss and simply obeying those higher up in rank in order to remain part of 
the political game. Therefore, according to the unwritten informal criteria 
that prevailed under the PRI regime, the promise of personal loyalty was 
the most impressive qualification an individual could offer to a superior.48 
45  V. Gelman, ‘Politics of Fear’, in A. Ledeneva, The Global Encyclopedia of Informality, 
London, forthcoming; V. Gel´man, ‘The Vicious Circle of Post-Soviet Neopatrimonialism 
in Russia’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 32, 2016, 5, pp. 455–73.
46  V. Pastukhov, ‘Mutnye instituty: “Reforma MVD” i krizis “reguliarnogo gosudarstva” 
v Rossii’, lecture given at St Antony’s College, Oxford, 3 February 2010; V. Volkov, Violent 
Entrepreneurs: The Use of Force in the Making of Russian Capitalism, Ithaca, NY, 2012.
47  Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?
48  M. Grindle, ‘Patrons and Clients in the Bureaucracy: Career Networks in Mexico’, 
Latin American Research Review, 12, 1977, pp. 37–66 (p. 41). 
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 In Tanzania self-censorship behaviours among political groups come 
about through internal CCM party discipline mechanisms: the president 
exercises tight control over the legislature given that by law all cabinet-
level ministries are to be held by members of parliament. Since all coveted 
cabinet-level positions are political appointees, there is an incentive 
for CCM Members of Parliament to show discipline and loyalty to the 
Executive in the hope of being awarded a high level position.
 At the grassroots level, our work in low-income rural areas in Mexico 
revealed a strong belief among community members that benefits from 
the government’s social programmes can be taken away as a means to 
punish ‘bad’ behaviours such as criticizing public officials, complaining 
against the quality of public services or voting for the ‘wrong’ party in 
an election.49 The observable result of such beliefs are actions adopted 
by community members, which are consistent with the self-censorship 
pattern; namely never criticizing public officials or the quality of public 
services and voting for the ruling party in elections.
Reciprocal control: peer pressure
Reciprocal mechanisms of informal control are exercised through peer 
pressure within closed networks and based on peer control, mutual watch 
and collective responsibility. The emphasis is on the group, rather than 
individuals, although they may be held together by shared individual 
interests, often hidden behind the rhetoric of kin, communal, ethnic or 
national patriotism. 
 In our three cases, peer pressure is associated with conformity about 
how things should be done and a degree of collective (ir)responsibility, 
where one is responsible for all and all are responsible for one. Peer 
pressure is inherently ambivalent as peer groups provide protection against 
external danger and access to resources, while at the same time exercising 
control and consolidating cohesion within the group.
 We find that the reliance on peer pressure mechanisms for monitoring 
and enforcement of controls is universally observable, but particularly 
functional in extra-legal contexts. These can be associated with rural or 
distant areas, closed communities (army, prisons, schools, youth gangs, 
socially excluded groups) or within weak legal frameworks, but also within 
political groups.
 With regard to the latter, indicative are the internal control mechanisms 
within political groups or cliques in Mexico (also known as camarillas).50 
49  Baez-Camargo and Megchún, ‘Old Regime Habits Die Hard’.
50  Grindle, ‘Patrons and Clients in the Bureaucracy’, p. 42.
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Such control mechanisms follow the peer pressure pattern and were seen as 
highly efficient in upholding internal regimes of discipline, responsibility 
and supervision. Clique members would be aware that mistakes made by 
them or their fellow group members could be extremely detrimental to 
the careers of all of them because the camarillas competed amongst each 
other for favours and for the trust of the incumbent president, who had 
the last word on the sensitive matter of presidential succession. Hence 
strict camarilla discipline reaped stages of rewards as the group’s political 
trajectory advanced, hopefully culminating in ‘the big one’ (la grande): the 
presidency of the republic. 
 At the grassroots level, our fieldwork took place in areas of rural 
Mexico, where communitarian values and practices are remarkably strong. 
This means that decisions are taken collectively and community members 
are subsequently vigilant of each other’s behaviours to ensure adherence, 
which results in rapid communication and enforcement of sanctions 
relative to individual members deviating from the ‘official’ position 
adopted by the community. In these cases, community-level mechanisms 
of social control are enforced to ensure alignment with collective decisions, 
which are perceived to protect the community from potentially detrimental 
actions on the part of outsiders.
 Historians point out that the Russian state legalized the informal 
governance observed within peasant communities — the principle 
of collective responsibility  (krugovaya poruka ) — for the purposes 
of tax collection, army conscription and crime control. The law on 
collective responsibility was only abolished in 1905. Mechanisms of mutual 
dependence vis-à-vis the state have generated practices of vigilance, 
informal monitoring, in-group surveillance, peer pressure as well as 
collective punishments to ensure the survival of the community vis-à-
vis external pressure.51 In Stalin’s time, regional elites used the principle 
of collective responsibility for resisting control and orders from above 
— covering up for power excesses by regional officials; protecting an 
official when compromising information about him was leaked to the 
centre; and punishing the whistle-blowers leaking such information.52 The 
immunity and protection provided by the community for its members 
51  See Ledeneva, How Russia Really Works; Geoffrey Hosking, ‘Forms of Social 
Solidarity in Russia and the Soviet Union’, in I. Marková (ed.), Trust and Democratic 
Transition in Post-Communist Europe, Oxford and New York, 2004, pp. 47–62.
52  Y. Gorlizki, ‘Too Much Trust: Regional Party Leaders and Local Political Networks 
under Brezhnev’, Slavic Review, 69, 2010, 3, pp. 676–700; O. V. Khlevnyuk, Master of the 
House: Stalin and His Inner Circle, Newhaven, CT, 2009; S. Fitzpatrick, On Stalin’s Team: 
The Years of Living Dangerously in Soviet Politics, Princeton, NJ, 2015.
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were intrinsically linked to the limited property rights and inter-group 
dependence, surfacing prominently again in the post-Communist 
transition of the 1990s in the contexts of organized crime and regional 
elites.
 The peer pressure control pattern implies that group members protect 
each other and feel responsible for their mutual well-being, but will 
also share shame, should it come to the revealing of corrupt practices. 
Therefore, Tanzanians use the expression kujipendekeza, which means 
flattering or ‘looking nice to somebody’, referring to the need to lie and 
do all that is necessary to protect one’s peers; in order to maintain a good 
standing within the group and to uphold loyalty as a highly valued quality, 
one often needs to ‘make others look good’.
Bottom-up control: social sanctions
Bottom up, the obligations of the public official who must deliver back to 
his or her particular constituencies are also enforced through informal 
control mechanisms that go hand in hand with the bottom-up co-optation 
pattern. Thus, whereas the bottom-up co-optation is effected on the basis 
of group ascription (considerations such as kinship, ethnicity or exchanged 
favours) the relationship is maintained on the basis of an expectation of 
reciprocity or amity, and the control is exercised on the basis of shame and 
reputation damage.53
 Accepting that individual needs are also extensive to each member 
of the group, group-belonging in Tanzania generates a strong sense 
of responsibility and duty among public officials that may directly be 
linked to the behaviours of public officials, who are expected to ‘eat’ on 
behalf of their extended group. This extended group reciprocity is also 
enforced through social sanctions, where the role of shame and shaming 
is significant. ‘Giving back’ to their community is a key motivation for 
public office holders who are intent on maintaining and ensuring loyalty, 
respect and status. Contrarily, failing to deliver the spoils of public office to 
those who feel entitled to a part of it is socially understood as an omission, 
entails deep shame on the part of the culprit and is considered offensive 
and disgraceful.54 
53  Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania, and ‘The Economy of Affection Revisited’; P. P. 
Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the Two Publics in Africa: A Theoretical Statement’, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 17, 1975, pp. 91–112. 
54  L. Koechlin, Corruption as an Empty Signifier: Politics and Political Order in Africa, 
Basel, 2010, p. 100.
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Camouflage
The institutional façades covering the realities of political co-optation and 
control represent the third modality of informal governance. Whether 
covering up the distance between formal procedures and real power or 
creating it where it is not there, façades are only partially façades. In fact, 
formal constraints are essential for the effectiveness of informal practices. 
In other words, the formal rules and institutions of the public sector (the 
façade) are sustained in order to manipulate, undercut, divert or exploit 
for the sake of informal interests. The camouflage patterns of informal 
governance serve in a functionally ambivalent way: they support the 
formal façades of the regime but only to subvert them, thus allowing the 
regime to reproduce according to its declared goals, while also subverting 
them in practice. However, this ambivalence in camouflage practices is 
unavoidable as they are needed for protection of both the regime and the 
networks that redistribute resources informally.
Creative façades
Creative façades are in place where an acceptable exterior disguises non-
acceptable practices inside. 
 A telling illustration of the meaning of creative façades comes from 
Russia, where the colloquial term for façades is ‘Potemkin villages’, deriving 
from a historical legend of creative accounting by Count Potemkin, who 
built façades of fake villages made of cardboard, along the journeying path 
of Catherine the Great in order to account for the embezzled budget funds 
designated for building those villages. In the Soviet planned economy, 
the term was linked to practices of mis- and over-reporting on planned 
performance targets (pripiski), essential for the legitimacy of the old Soviet 
regime, but unable to persist according to its own declared rules.55
 Historically, regime survival strategies in Mexico also relied 
on maintaining a façade of elite consensus among members of the 
Revolutionary Family. During the PRI era conflict and disagreements were 
channelled through specific, covert and highly coded political rituals. The 
media, heavily dependent on bribes and official funds, played a key role 
in conveying encoded messages between political elites and in building 
up the public images of potential presidential candidates. The importance 
of symbolic gestures hidden underneath official protocols was captured 
by the expression ‘in politics, form is the content’ (en política, la forma es 
55  In contemporary Russia, Potemkin villages are associated with hiding real owners’ 
assets.  
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el fondo) as minted by PRI insider and intellectual Jesús Reyes Heroles. 
This is illustrated by a picture of a Mexican governor greeting a municipal 
president who had fallen out of grace while placing his hand across his 
chest to prevent the subordinate from giving him the mandatory hug 
common among politicians who were on good terms.56 This emphasis on 
encoded messages stands in sharp contrast with the irrelevance of official 
speeches, public statements and government events where the official line 
was strictly to maintain an image of elite consensus. 
 One indicator for the pervasiveness of camouflage is the implementation 
gap, a reflection of which is a declared commitment to anti-corruption in 
discourse, but not in practice in our three case studies. There are many 
examples of leaders’ impassioned proclamations against corruption and 
the adoption of significant legal and institutional reforms to that effect, 
followed by very little substantive actions. Anti-corruption campaigns 
have often come about during electoral campaigns, at times of crisis or 
with increased pressure from international donors, and are therefore 
symptomatic of the manipulation of the discourse on corruption and anti-
corruption as window dressing in the pursuit of narrow political interests.
 A significant dimension of camouflage emerges out of the intense 
international donor intervention and its impact on Tanzanian anti-
corruption legislation. As a major aid recipient globally,57 Tanzania has 
given in to international donors’ demands to significantly strengthen 
oversight and regulatory agencies. In addition to enacting numerous 
laws relating to public finance management, audits and anti-corruption, 
specialized agencies such as the Prevention and Control of Corruption 
Bureau (PCCB) the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority (PPRA), and 
the National Audit Office (NAO) have been created. The resulting legal 
framework adjusts perfectly to Western expectations of best practices, thus 
providing a politically acceptable façade to cover up the predominance 
of redistributive practices associated with co-optation. In practice, 
implementation of the anti-corruption legal framework is impeded by the 
lack of enforcement powers and virtual impotence of the newly founded 
agencies (PCCB, PPRA), which remain politically compromised by being 
under the auspices of the Presidential Office. 
56  J. Araujo López, ‘En Política, La Forma es Fondo’, in Jesús Reyes Heroles (ed.), Mitos 
y Otros Cuentos, Mexico City, 2012.
57  Since 2007 Tanzania has been receiving approximately 2.7 billion USD per year. See 
also, Barak D. Hoffman, ‘Political Economy Analysis of Tanzania’, Center for Democracy 
and Civil Society, Georgetown College, Washington, D.C., March 2013, p. 22.
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 Very often, creative façades are put forward by way of euphemisms 
and references to local norms and practices. Thus, bribing in Tanzania is 
often given different names like ‘takrima’ (which translates as favour or 
hospitality from Swahili) that would eventually cover up and make it look 
like it is a normal and legal act. Other common local terms that frame 
bribing as a normal practice include ‘kutoa kitu kidogo/chochote’ (meaning 
giving out something small in return for something), ‘kujiongeza’ (doing 
something to achieve what you want), or ‘kueleweka’ (to make oneself 
understood).58
Hidden constitutions
The expression ‘hidden constitutions’ refers to situations where formal 
constitutional powers do not necessarily reflect how real power is 
exercised. The complex relationship between the formal façades and the 
informal backstage of power is best encapsulated by the metaphor of a 
puppet theatre. Playing on the distance between front and back stage, 
manipulating identities, using intermediaries or front persons and creating 
virtual realities, it provides a contextual model by which to examine 
presentation of self, virtual reality in the postmodernist age, virtual 
politics and (in theory) post-Communist privatization.59 
 The gap between formal and informal power is often related to 
blurred boundaries, as has been the case between the ruling party and 
the Tanzanian state. Although a formal separation exists between the 
two, ‘almost all civil servants are indirectly accountable to the CCM and 
the party leadership determines almost all material policy choices’.60 An 
illustration of this is how District Executive Directors, while formally the 
most powerful public servants in the districts, are in reality superseded 
in effective power and influence by the District Commissioners, who are 
presidential appointees and CCM representatives, and are known to play a 
significant role in mobilizing votes for the ruling party during elections. 
58  Baez-Camargo and Sambaiga, ‘Between Condemnation and Resignation’.
59  E. Goffman, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, New York, 1959; D. Holmes, 
Virtual Politics: Identity and Community in Cyberspace, London 1997; A. Wilson, Virtual 
Politics: Faking Democracy in the Post-Soviet World, New Haven, CT, 2005; J. Allina-
Pisano, The Post-Soviet Potemkin Village: Politics and Property Rights in the Black Earth, 
Cambridge and New York, 2008; S. Newton, The Constitutional Systems of the Independent 
Central Asian States: A Contextual Analysis, London, 2017.
60  Hoffman, ‘Political Economy Analysis of Tanzania’, p. 11. 
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Fluid identities
Camouflage also can be associated with a blurring of the public/private 
interests and associated roles taken up by influential individuals. Thus, 
the more extreme form of camouflage and ultimate case of ambivalence 
is the complete role reversal, whereby holders of a public office not only 
pursue their business interests or skim financial benefits, but turn into 
‘werewolves in epaulets’ or ‘werewolves in uniforms’ — as expressed in 
this post-Soviet phrase. It reflects the appetites of the law enforcement and 
intelligence officers to clandestinely acquire personal wealth and in doing 
so, their capacity to transgress all human norms. It is when the job turns 
into its opposite,61 and those charged with defending the public are widely 
perceived as abusing the public and engaging in illegal raids on private 
businesses, that vernacular knowledge such as ‘werewolves in epaulets’ 
emerge.62 Russia’s ‘werewolves’ are associated with ‘moonlighting’ by law 
enforcement officials, routinely crossing the boundaries between their 
public duties and private (or informally affiliated) businesses.
 A very similar pattern is mirrored in the Mexican expression ‘to bite’ 
(mordida), which refers to the subtle request by ‘biters’, such as police officers 
(mordelones), to be paid a bribe. Nowadays, the power and influence of 
drug cartels has added a new dimension to nebulous boundaries between 
outlaws and officials: deserters from the army and police forces, trained 
in tactical operations and the handling of weapons, are allegedly merging 
into one often indistinguishable group of security officials and cartel 
members.63 A former associate of an influential drug baron described in a 
published statement how ‘everyone’ in the organization had either military 
or police affiliation. Confusing images thus arise out of the drug war in 
Mexico, where killings in broad daylight may be carried out by men in 
police uniforms and it is not always clear whether the perpetrators were 
thugs masquerading as policemen or actual policemen providing paid 
assistance to thugs.64
 The intrinsic ambivalence of multiple or fluid identities means that 
Tanzanian leaders delivering informally accrued benefits to their groups 
61  G. Mars, Cheats at Work: An Anthropology of Workplace Crime, London, 1983.
62  Ledeneva, Can Russia Modernise?, p. 195.
63  John Bailey and Matthew M. Taylor, ‘Evade, Corrupt, or Confront? Organized Crime 
and the State in Brazil and Mexico’, Journal of Politics in Latin America, 1, 2009, pp. 3–29 
(p. 19).
64  P. R. Keefe, ‘Cocaine Incorporated’, The New York Times Magazine, 15 June 
2012 <www.nytimes.com/2012/06/17/magazine/how-a-mexican-drug-cartel-makes-its-
billions.html?_r=0> [accessed 12 October 2016].
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are cherished as ‘Wakwetu’ (local sons or leaders who care about their own 
people), whereas the same leaders are denounced as ‘Mafisadi’ (a common 
derogatory Swahili expression) by those excluded from special treatment. 
Conclusion: ambivalence and the public/private cross-over 
So far we have identified three modalities of informal governance observed 
in our three cases. For analytical purposes we discuss them separately, but 
in practice they are highly interdependent. In order to manage and protect 
the informal redistribution of state resources enacted through practices of 
co-optation and control, camouflage measures are part and parcel. Our 
distinction of informal governance modalities has at least two important 
implications.
 First, the informal re-distribution of state resources among exclusive 
networks entails the collapse of a public/private divide. This leads us 
to question some of the underlying assumptions of the prevailing, 
global corruption paradigm. Most mainstream definitions of corruption 
hinge upon a notion that something public is subverted into something 
private (misuse of funds, abuse of office, betrayal of trust). Thus, the 
analytical distinction between the public and private spheres is often 
taken for granted. However, neither the empirical evidence nor theoretical 
considerations seem to support such an a priori assumption.65 Such a 
discrepancy has been a major obstacle for conventional anti-corruption 
prescriptions. Founded upon a principal-agent model, these prescriptions 
rely on the existence of widely accepted rules about the boundaries between 
the public and the private spheres. Rather, by underplaying the analytical 
distinction between the public and the private and focusing on the grey 
zones created by their overlap and interplay, we highlight the implications 
and impact of informal governance norms in contexts where corruption is 
endemic. 
65  J. Weintraub and K. Kumar, Public and Private in Thought and Practice: Perspectives 
on a Grand Dichotomy, Chicago, IL, 1997; D. M. L. Kennedy, ‘Stages of the Decline of the 
Private/Public Distinction’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 6 1982, pp. 1349–57; R. 
Sennett, The Fall of the Public Man, New York, 1977; A. M. Orum and Z. P. O’Neal (eds), 
Common Ground? Reading and Reflections on Public Space, London, 2010; L. Wacquant, 
Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity, Durham, NC and 
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 The informal governance patterns reveal networks of ‘insiders’ that, in 
pursuing their interests, affect an informal redistribution of state resources 
at the expense of excluded groups of ‘outsiders’. The borderline between 
insiders and outsiders within networks is much more indeterminate than 
implied by the public/private distinction, yet its shifting nature is not 
taken into account in policy making. In the light of these conclusions, the 
mere differentiation between the public and private spheres as the basis for 
common corruption paradigms becomes problematic, if not obsolete.
 Second, the interrelationship between the three informal governance 
modalities where co-optation may only be sustained with adequate control 
mechanisms and the extent that it needs to be camouflaged entails that 
the practices involved in the informal governance regimes are inevitably 
ambivalent. In other words, we find that the tensions arising from multiple 
normative frameworks are resolved in practice by virtue of the ambivalent 
meanings and elusiveness attached to informal norms and practices. 
 Recognizing the inherent ambivalent nature of informal practices 
contributes to a better understanding of the entrenchment and resilience of 
corrupt behaviours. Exchange of favours can be imbued with a multiplicity 
of meanings, implications, values and expectations — all simultaneously 
implied and yet not made explicit.66 For instance, what is given as a 
reward for loyalty can be taken away and punishment can ensue, informal 
understandings may be overturned by the application of the formal 
normative framework and the reward effectively turns into a trap. 
 The ambivalence of informal practices also places contradictory 
demands upon the occupants of a status in a particular social relation. 
Therefore, a public official may be expected simultaneously to execute 
public policy, protect collaborators and provide preferential access to 
resources to his or her kinship group. Since competing norms and 
obligations cannot be simultaneously complied with, they come to be 
expressed in an ‘oscillation of behaviors’, in the form of ‘detachment 
and compassion, of discipline and permissiveness, of personal and 
impersonal treatment’.67 Such motivational ambivalence is linked to 
norms of reciprocity, which is in turn linked to social stability.68 As an 
66  A. Ledeneva, ‘The Ambivalence of Favour: Paradoxes of Russia’s Economy of 
Favours’, in D. Henig and N. Makovicky (eds), Economies of Favour after Socialism, 
Oxford, 2017, pp. 21–49, and ‘The Ambivalence of Blurred Boundaries: Where Informality 
Stops and Corruption Begins’, Perspectives, 12, Winter 2014–15, pp. 19–22.
67  R. K. Merton, Sociological Ambivalence and Other Essays, New York, 1976, p. 8.
68  A. W. Gouldner, ‘The Norm of Reciprocity: A Preliminary Statement’, American 
Sociological Review, 25, 1960, 2, pp. 161–78.
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illustration, where the public office is prebendal, or ridden with substantive 
ambivalence (partly public, partly privatized) we also observe ‘normative 
ambivalence’ or double standards displayed by the public. Thus, practices 
of ‘receiving a bone’, ‘feeding’ and ‘eating’ are not only associated with 
corruption but also accepted; corruption is condemned as morally wrong 
but at the same time tolerated. The seeming contradictions are resolved 
in the so-called ‘misrecognition game’: receiving privileges, rewards and 
competitive advantages is acceptable in one’s own case, but are viewed as 
corrupt when given to others. 
 Furthermore, the fluidity of meanings and identities emanating from 
the ambivalent nature of informal norms is often manipulated by insiders 
of the system, for whom mastery of this hidden language is often an 
indispensable requisite for political survival. Across our three cases — 
Mexico, Russia, Tanzania — this ambivalent nature of informal norms and 
practices is a key to understanding how and why the same mechanisms 
that may be used to reward supporters and co-opt dissenters also can be 
utilized to enforce discipline and good governance. 
 To the extent that a regime is defined as ‘the ensemble of patterns, 
explicit or not, that determines the forms and channels of access to 
principal governmental positions, the characteristics of the actors who are 
admitted and excluded from such access, and the resources [and] strategies 
that they can use to gain access’,69 we can claim that the modalities that 
we have identified amount to nothing less than effective instruments of 
informal governance, actively used for sustaining political regimes.
 We believe that a next step in the direction of exploring the potential 
of harnessing informal practices to improve development outcomes and 
decrease corruption necessitates more research that continues to decode 
the various manners in which informal governance practices usurp the 
functions attributed to formal political regimes. Thus, co-optation practices 
serve to ensure regime survival because they play a role in addressing the 
essential problems faced by political elites of avoiding intra-elite splits, 
constructing loyalties and preventing the strengthening of groups that 
may contest power.70 Whereas in formal frameworks associated with good 
69  G. O’Donnell and P. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, Baltimore, MD, 1986, p. 73.
70  B. B. de Mesquita, A. Smith, R. M. Siverson and J. D. Morrow, The Logic of Political 
Survival, Cambridge, MA, 2005; B. B. De Mesquita and A. Smith, ‘Leader Survival, 
Revolutions, and the Nature of Government Finance’, American Journal of Political 
Science, 54, 2010, pp. 936–50; M. W. Svolik, The Politics of Authoritarian Rule, Cambridge 
and New York, 2012.
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governance and anti-corruption, enforcement typically involves elements 
such as transparency, informal groups are bound together by considerations 
such as reciprocity, loyalty, amity, reputation and coercion.71 
 Following this logic, we need to focus not only on the informal practices 
that work but also on how to make them work for promoting positive 
change. For instance, corruption created by bottom up co-optation could 
be targeted by generating incentives for social networks to discourage 
demands made on the basis of amity and by harnessing the collective 
action potential of social ties and informal practices for the reform.
71  Banuri and Eckel point out that researchers have identified four main informal 
enforcement mechanisms that reinforce adherence to informal contracts: trust, reputation, 
hostage-taking and reciprocity. See S. Banuri and C. Eckel, ‘Experiments in Culture and 
Corruption: A Review’, Research in Experimental Economics, 15, 2012, pp. 51–76.
